Personalidade de Tony Blair e a Guerra do Iraque - História (2024)

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Personality and Foreign Policy: TonyBlair’s Iraq DecisionsSTEPHEN BENEDICT DYSONWabash CollegeThe British choice in Iraq has been characterized as ‘‘Tony Blair’s War,’’with many believing that the personality and leadership style of theprime minister played a crucial part in determining British participa-tion. Is this the case? To investigate, I employ at-a-distance measures torecover Blair’s personality from his responses to foreign policy questionsin the House of Commons. I find that he has a high belief in his ability tocontrol events, a low conceptual complexity, and a high need for power.Using newly available evidence on British decision making, I show howBlair’s personality and leadership style did indeed shape both the proc-ess and outcome of British foreign policy toward Iraq. The researchreemphasizes the importance of individual level factors in theories offoreign policy, as well as offering a comprehensive explanation of acritical episode.Reflecting upon the decision to attack Iraq, a senior British cabinet minister com-mented that ‘‘had anyone else been leader, we would not have fought alongsideBush’’ (Stephens 2004:234). Is this a valid claim? To put it differently, would an-other occupant of the post of British prime minister, presented with the same set ofcirc*mstances, have acted as Tony Blair did? While it has been suggested thatwhoever is prime minister, the ‘‘special relationship’’ determines that Britain willfollow the U.S. lead in all circ*mstances, there is a good deal of prima facie evidencesuggesting that Blair’s distinctive individual characteristics are a crucial factor inexplaining the Iraq choices. Blair was not overly pressured by the Bush admin-istration into joining the Iraq coalition, and the president directly offered him a wayto step back from participation after Blair encountered difficulties generating do-mestic support for the war (Naughtie 2004:144). Secretary of Defense DonaldRumsfeld declared a general indifference to the question of ultimate British par-ticipation, stating on the eve of war, when it appeared as if Blair might not be able toget authorization from parliament to commit British troops, that the forces werenot essential in any case (Naughtie 2004:145). A close adviser, convinced of theimportance of Blair’s personality to the outcome, comments that ‘‘there were six orseven moments in the Iraq story when he could have drawn back. He could have,and he didn’t’’ (Naughtie 2004:79).Further, Blair had been a proponent of action against former Iraq PresidentSaddam Hussein long before the Bush administration began the buildup to war. InAuthor’s note: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meetings of the International StudiesAssociation, Honolulu, HI, March 1–5th 2005 and the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association,Chicago, IL, 7–10th April 2005. In addition to participants on these panels, I thank David Patrick Houghton and thejournal’s reviewers for their helpful comments.r 2006 International Studies Association.Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.Foreign Policy Analysis (2006) 2, 289–306both public and private, Blair had settled upon the basic parameters of his policytoward Iraq as early as 1998. During the UN weapon inspectors crisis of that year,Blair stated that: ‘‘The Saddam Hussein we face today is the same Saddam Husseinwe faced yesterday. He has not changed. He remains an evil, brutal dictator . . . It isnow clearer than ever that his games have to stop once and for all. If they do not,the consequences should be clear to all’’ (Butler Report 2004:54, paragraph 212).In a private conversation with the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party PaddyAshdown, during mid-November 1997, Blair said ‘‘I have now seen some of thestuff (intelligence) on this. It really is pretty scary. He (Saddam) is very close to someappalling weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I don’t understand why the Frenchand others don’t understand this. We cannot let him get away with it. The worldthinks this is just gamesmanship. But it’s deadly serious’’ (Ashdown 2001:127).Either of those statements would accurately describe Blair’s position 5 years later.This does suggest that we should take Blair seriously when he insists that he was notmerely ‘‘Bush’s poodle,’’ as he did to the Parliamentary Labour Party in February2003: ‘‘People say you are doing this because the Americans are telling you to do it.I keep telling them that it’s worse than that. I believe in it’’ (Riddell 2003:1).Within the field of foreign policy analysis, it has often been suggested that foreignpolicy crises and wars involve conditions which favor the influence of personality,and that individuals’ distinctive policy preferences, decision-making styles, and re-lationships to advisers are crucial elements in accounting for outcomes (Greenstein1967; Holsti 1976:30; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977; Hermann 1980a, 1980b, 1983,1984; Winter 1987, 1993; Hermann and Preston 1994; Preston 1997; Preston andt’Hart 1999; Winter 2003:112). Working from this basis, this article seeks to in-vestigate the impact of Blair’s personality upon Britain’s Iraq policy. Specifically, Iutilize the Leadership Trait Analysis technique to recover the personality traits ofTony Blair through content analysis of his responses to foreign policy questions inthe British House of Commons. I find that Blair measures as having a high belief inhis ability to control events, a low conceptual complexity, and a high need forpower. Drawing upon newly available evidence concerning Britain’s Iraq decisionmaking, I demonstrate the role these personality traits played in shaping the policyprocess and outcome in Britain. This research reemphasizes the importance ofactor specific factors in theories of foreign policy, as well as offering a comprehen-sive explanation of a critical foreign policy decision. The first step is to introduceand apply procedures for measuring Tony Blair’s personality.At-A-Distance Personality AssessmentUnder certain circ*mstances, individual characteristics of major international fig-ures can have important impacts on policy outcomes (Greenstein 1967; Winter2003:112). High-level, nonroutine policy making tasks, often involving crises andwar, are perhaps the most prominent of these circ*mstances. In this context, muchattention has been given to issues of conceptualization and measurement of indi-vidual psychological factors.The so-called ‘‘at-a-distance’’ measures of the individual characteristics of polit-ical leaders have become increasingly prominent in recent years (Winter and Ste-wart 1977; Winter et al. 1991; Schafer 2000). At-a-distance methods are designed toprovide valid, reliable data on leaders, and to mitigate the problem of the lack ofdirect access to political leaders and to private material which might reveal theirindividual characteristics (Taber 2000:6; Winter 2003:113). Indeed, the core as-sumption of the at-a-distance approach is that the public verbal output of politicalleaders, when processed by content analysis schemes linked to psychological con-cepts, can reveal important information about their world views and decision styles(Schafer 2000:512; Winter 2003:114).Personality and Foreign Policy290Among the most prominent of the at-a-distance techniques is Margaret Her-mann’s Leadership Trait Analysis framework, an approach which focuses uponpolitically relevant personality traits. Leadership Trait Analysis conceptualizes per-sonality as a combination of seven traits: belief in ability to control events, concep-tual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-confidence,and task orientation. An individual’s score on these variables is measured through acontent analysis of their verbal output. More specifically, ‘‘an assumption is madethat the more frequentlyleaders use certain words and phrases in their interviewresponses (and other verbal behavior) the more salient such content is to them . . .At issue is what percentage of the time when leaders could exhibit particular wordsand phrases they are, indeed, used’’ (Hermann 2003:186). The coding proceduresare relatively straightforward. Extensive dictionaries were developed to correspondwith each of the seven traits of interest. Words are categorized as being indicative ofeither a low or a high score on each trait. The leader’s verbal output is then scannedfor these words, with the score on each trait being the ratio of words tagged as‘‘low’’ versus ‘‘high,’’ for a final score between 0 and 1. The conceptualization andcoding rules for the seven traits are summarized in Table 1.Initial studies using the Leadership Trait Analysis framework used hand coding oftexts. These procedures were labor intensive and time consuming, and raised con-cerns over the necessarily small samples of text used and the potential for scorer bias(Rasler, Thompson, and Chester 1980). However, developments in computer process-ing capabilities and software design have allowed for the automation of the technique(Young 2000; Mahdasian 2002). This eliminates intercoder reliability concerns as thecomputer perfectly replicates the coding results for a given piece of text each time.Additionally, vastly greater volumes of text can be coded given the improvements inthe speed of processing in moving from hand to automated coding (Walker 2000).Using this technique, Hermann and others have studied the personality andleadership style of a wide range of individuals: modern American presidents, Sub-Saharan African leaders, Soviet Politburo members, Iranian revolutionary leaders,and heads of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and theEuropean Union (Hermann 1984, 1987a, 1987b; Mastors 2000; Preston 2001;Taysi and Preston 2001; Kille and Scully 2003). Individual characteristics have beenlinked to factors such as the degree to which a leader challenges or respects con-straints in the international environment, their openness to information, their mo-tivation for leading, and their preferences over the structure and operation ofadvisory systems and decision processes (Hermann 2003; Schafer 2000; Preston2001). Reviewing progress made within this research program, Kille and Scully(2003:175) note ‘‘strong support now exists for the argument that leaders haveparticular and identifiable traits that predispose them to behave in certain ways.’’Method and DataTo measure Blair’s personality, I collected and analyzed the universe of his re-sponses to parliamentary questions focused upon foreign policy from May 5, 1997(his first day in office) to March 19, 2003 (the beginning of the Iraq War), availablethrough the Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates series: a verbatim record of every wordspoken in the British House of Commons. Responses to parliamentary questionsmeet many of the desired criteria as source materials for Leadership Trait Analysis.They are from a single source, eliminating the possibility of differential audienceand venue effects. In relation to many types of material, such as set-piece speeches,they are quite spontaneous, reducing the risk that they are thoroughly prepared(and thus impression managed) answers, composed by an aide or speechwriter.11 The prime minister is not given copies of questions in advance. There are two ways in which a member of theHouse can ask the prime minister a question. Firstly, a member can schedule in advance a proforma question askingSTEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON 291TABLE1.TraitConceptualizationandCodingSchemeTraitDescriptionCodingBeliefinabilitytocontroleventsPerceptionoftheworldasanenvironmentleadercaninfluence.Leader’sownstateisperceivedasaninfluentialactorintheinternationalsystemPercentageofverbsusedthatreflectactionorplanningforactionoftheleaderorrelevantgroupConceptualcomplexityCapabilityofdiscerningdifferentdimensionsoftheenvironmentwhendescribingactors,places,ideas,andsituationsPercentageofwordsrelatedtohighcomplexity(i.e.,‘‘approximately,’’‘‘possibility,’’‘‘trend’’)vs.lowcomplexity(i.e.,‘‘absolutely,’’‘‘certainly,’’‘‘irreversible’’)DistrustofothersDoubtaboutandwarinessofothers.Percentageofnounsthatindicatemisgivingsorsuspicionsthatothersintendharmtowardspeakerorspeaker’sgroupIn-groupbiasPerceptionofone’sgroupasholdingacentralrole,accompaniedwithstrongfeelingsofnationalidentityandhonorPercentageofreferencestothegroupthatarefavorable(i.e.,‘‘successful,’’‘‘prosperous,’’‘‘great’’),showstrength(i.e.,‘‘powerful,’’‘‘capable’’)oraneedtomaintaingroupidentity(i.e.,‘‘decideourownpolicies,’’‘‘defendourborders’’).NeedforpowerAconcernwithgaining,keepingandrestoringpoweroverothersPercentageofverbsthatreflectactionsofattack,advise,influencethebehaviorofothers,concernwithreputationSelfconfidencePersonalimageofself-importanceintermsoftheabilitytodealwiththeenvironmentPercentageofpersonalpronounsusedsuchas‘‘my,’’‘‘myself,’’‘‘I,’’‘‘me,’’and‘‘mine,’’whichshowspeakerperceivesselfastheinstigatorofanactivity,anauthorityfigure,orarecipientofapositiverewardTaskorientationRelativefocusonproblemsolvingversusmaintenanceofrelationshiptoothers.HigherscoreindicatesgreaterproblemfocusPercentageofwordsrelatedtoinstrumentalactivities(i.e.,‘‘accomplishment,’’‘‘plan,’’‘‘proposal’’)versusconcernforother’sfeelingsanddesires(i.e.,‘‘collaboration,’’‘‘amnesty,’’‘‘appreciation’’)Note:CodingrulesfromHermann(1987a,2003).Personality and Foreign Policy292The use of responses to parliamentary questions is advantageous in one otherrespectFit provides a great deal of material for analysis. While the prime ministermay answer questions posed by the press rarely if they so desire, they are mandatedto appear before parliament at least once per week at prime minister’s questionsand whenever there is a major debate on government policy. The result of thisprolific prime ministerial output is that the profile of Blair’s personality whichforms the basis for this study rests upon 140,000 þ words spoken by the primeministerFvastly more that the 5,000 word suggested minimum. The actual analysiswas performed using the automated content analysis software engine ‘‘ProfilerPlus.’’ As noted above, the use of computer coding eliminates reliability concernsand allows for a great deal of material to be processed.Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis technique has been used to generate per-sonality profiles of many political leaders. The value in the wide application of thistechnique is that it is possible to compare each new leader analyzed against apreviously established reference group, giving some substantive meaning to thedata that is generated. However, while it is valuable to compare a particular leaderto peers from around the world, the existing reference groups are heterogeneoussamples of political leaders from many different countries and political systems. Inrecognition of the importance of comparing Blair to other possible individuals whocould have occupied the post, I repeated the procedures for isolating his trait scoresfor all 11 other post-1945 British prime ministers. Therefore, Blair’s personalitycan be compared with both a heterogeneous sample of 51 other political leaders,and a hom*ogenous sample of 12 modern British prime ministers generated bycontent analysis of the universe of their responses to foreign policy questions in theHouse of Commons.Blair’s PersonalityTable 2 reports Blair’s personality scores, in comparison to reference groups of 51world political leaders and 12 British prime ministers profiled using the samemethodology. These reference groups establish a baseline against which Blair’spersonality can be assessed. Hermann (2003:186) suggests that individuals shouldTABLE 2. Tony Blair’s Personality and Two Comparison GroupsIndividual Characteristic51 PoliticalLeadersStandardDeviation12 BritishPrime MinistersStandardDeviation Tony BlairBelief in ability to control events 0.35 0.04 0.33 0.05 0.45 (high)Conceptual complexity 0.57 0.04 0.55 0.04 0.50 (low)Distrust of others 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.10 (average)In-group bias 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.08 (average)Need for power 0.24 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.30 (high)Self-confidence 0.41 0.08 0.40 0.05 0.39 (average)Task orientation 0.63 0.06 0.69 0.05 0.66 (average)Data on 51 world political leaders provided by Michael Young, Social Science Automation Inc., personal commu-nication.the prime minister to list his or her engagements for the day, and then asking a substantive follow-up. This‘‘supplementary’’ can be ‘‘any question that relates to prime ministerial responsibilities or . . . any aspect of gov-ernment policy’’ (‘‘Parliamentary Questions,’’ available at http://www.parliament.U.K./factsheets). The secondsource of questions are members who have not scheduled in advance, but indicate that they would like to ask aquestion by standing up and ‘‘catching the Speaker’s eye.’’ The Speaker of the House selects the individual and theprime minister has no control over who is chosen. This means that while a prime minister can perhaps anticipatesome of the topics they will be asked to address given the news of the day, they have no way of knowing the specificform or thrust of the questions in advance.STEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON 293be considered high or low in the seven traits based on whether they score outside ofone standard deviation from the mean of the relevant reference group.Blair emerges as distinctive on three personality traits, and several studies haveestablished links between high or low scores on these traits and decision-makingbehavior in foreign policy (Hermann 1980a,; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Preston2001). Below I summarize the distinctive aspects of Blair’s personality and theexpectations as to his behavior.2 The approach here is to focus upon the personalitytraits in which Blair is distinctive from comparable political figuresFhis internallocus of control, low conceptual complexity, and high need for power. Of course, itis meaningful to know those traits upon which he is similar to others, but the logicof individual level analysis is that individual differences are important to outcomes,making the nature of those differences the crucial explanatory factor.High Belief in Ability to Control EventsTony Blair scores as over two standard deviations above the mean of both the 51leader reference group and the 12 British prime minister reference group in hisbelief in ability to control events. This trait indicates the individual’s subjectivelyperceived degree of control over the political environment. Leaders higher in thistrait believe themselves to be efficacious in relation to the political environment on apersonal level, and perceive that their state is an influential political actor. A higherbelief in ability to control events is hypothesized to lead to a more proactive policyorientation, and a perception that the barriers to successful action are surmount-able. Belief in ability to control events, as a central perceptual trait, represents thesubjective locus of control of the individual: internal (a higher score) or external (alower score), and as such has also been a central concern of research into oper-ational codes (George 1969; Walker 1977; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). Ofcourse, a subjective individual belief in personal efficacy does not necessarily trans-late into objective reality, and individuals high in this belief can be prone to over-reach. In applications of this trait to foreign policy outputs Hermann (2003) foundthat, when combined with need for power, belief in ability to control events pre-dicted the extent to which a political leader would challenge constraints within theinternational system. Similarly, Kaarbo and Hermann (1998:252–253) found thatnon-U.S. leaders who measure as high in this trait, such as former British PrimeMinister Margaret Thatcher and former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer,exhibited expansionist foreign policy orientations.2 What if the results obtained differ when Blair is speaking only about Iraq? If this were the case, Blair’s scoreswould seem to be driven by situational factors rather than reflect underlying personality traits. In order to test thispossibility, I extracted all of Blair’s comments solely on Iraq and performed the at-a-distance trait analysis on thismaterial, with these results (relationship to Blair’s overall trait scores derived from the entirety of his verbal outputin parentheses):Belief in Ability to Control Events: 45 (� 0)Conceptual Complexity: 50 (� 0)Distrust of Others: 11(þ 1)In-Group Bias: 6 (� 2)Need for Power: 26 (� 4)Self Confidence: 47 (þ 8)Task Orientation: 67 (þ 1)On the three key traits Blair’s categorization does not change. The only substantive differences obtained are thatBlair moves from being average-low to low on in-group bias (which is not a focus of my analysis), and movesmarginally into the high category in relation to the 12 prime minister reference group on self confidence, whileremaining in the average category in relation to the 51 political leader group. Of course, Blair said much less on Iraqduring a short period of time than on foreign policy over his entire period in office, and so the scores derived fromIraq material are based on a much smaller sample of his speechFthis sampling effect is the probable source of thesmall variation observed. The overall stability shown across the two analyses provides support for the propositionthat the method is picking up underlying personality traits.Personality and Foreign Policy294In terms of the decision making process, Preston (1996/1997) found that leadershigher in belief in ability to control events tended to prefer proactive policy so-lutions and a less deliberative decision process. With his high score on this trait, wewould expect from Blair a proactive policy stance and a relatively low weighting ofthe environmental constraints to political action in his decision calculus.Low Conceptual ComplexityBlair scores more than one standard deviation below the means of both referencegroups on conceptual complexity. This trait indicatesthe degree of differentiationan individual shows in describing the environment within which they operate:people, places, actors, and things (Hermann 1980a:21). Individuals higher in thistrait operate with a more nuanced view of the political world, develop compleximages of others, and perceive a wide array of factors as relevant to a decision.Individuals who are lower, by contrast, operate with a more black and white view ofevents and actors, are comfortable with relatively straightforward binary classifi-cation schemes (i.e., ‘‘good and evil,’’ ‘‘them and us’’), and make decisions based ona more restricted calculus of significant factors. Higher complexity is thereforeassociated with a desire to obtain more information before making a decision, and adesire to carefully monitor the environment for feedback on the results of the initialdecision. Lower complexity is associated with a willingness to make decisions basedupon limited information, and the possibility of a failure to perceive, or a propen-sity to discount, information which is indicative of a failing course of action.In terms of linking complexity to foreign policy outputs, Hermann (1980a:40)found that lower complexity can be associated with a more committed and ag-gressive foreign policy (see also Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977). In examining theeffect of complexity upon decision-making processes, Preston (2001) found that lowcomplexity individuals exhibited a more decisive style, and engaged in a morerestricted information search than higher complexity leaders (see also Kowert2002). With his low score on this trait we would expect from Blair a straightforwardinformation processing style, characterized by limited search and an emphasis onbinary categorizations, a decisive decision orientation with a minimum of innergovernment debate and discussion, and a relatively low degree of reconsiderationof fundamental policies.High Need for PowerThe final personality trait upon which Blair is distinctive is need for power, uponwhich he scores more than two standard deviations higher than the referencegroup means. Need for power, which draws upon the psychology of motivation,indicates the impulse to gain, maintain, or restore the individual’s control overpeople, policy process, and outcomes. Individuals higher in the need for powerrequire greater personal control and involvement in policy, and have an increasedconcern that the policy output reflect their preference, rather than be a consensualgroup decision. By contrast, the lower the need for power, the greater the will-ingness to delegate and to accept an outcome contrary to the individual’s desire. Asa central motivational factor in leadership style, need for power has a long lineagein the study of political elites (Winter 1987, 1992, 1993) Hermann (2003:195–196)suggests that individuals high in the need for power will acquire a great degree ofexpertise in sizing up situations and people, such that they will be very skilled inensuring that outcomes reflect their preferences.Preston (2001) found that need for power was a central determinant of decision-making processes, in particular shaping the nexus between leaders and advisorygroups. Individuals higher in need for power, Preston found, shaped advisoryprocesses that facilitated their constant involvement in policy formulation, decision,STEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON 295and implementation. They tended to concentrate debate and decision within tight‘‘inner circles’’ of advisers who did not necessarily occupy positions of formal au-thority, but were of like mind and personally dependent upon the leader. Prestonargued that while this minimized policy drift and bureaucratic delay, there was acost in terms of the diversity of viewpoints that were represented in the decisionprocess (see also Preston and t’Hart 1999). By contrast, individuals lower in theneed for power exhibited less activist leadership styles, and were more comfortablewith delegating responsibility and working through regularized structures thatdiffuse authority to others. Given Blair’s high score in need for power, we wouldexpect him to be heavily involved in all aspects of policy formation, and to shape anadvisory and decision process based upon small groups of hand-picked individuals,relegating formal structures such as the cabinet and the Foreign Office to at best a‘‘rubber stamp’’ role.In summary, Blair scores as having a high belief in his ability to control events, alow conceptual complexity, and a high need for power. These scores allow for thegeneration of predictive hypotheses concerning decision-making behavior andpolicy preferences. With expectations established as to the impact of Blair’s per-sonality upon policy outputs and processes, I turn to an examination of Iraq de-cision making in Britain.The Iraq DecisionsRecently available evidence makes it possible to explore the making of policy to-ward Iraq in detail. The decision-making process has since become quite contro-versial, and consequently many of the relevant facts have become public record,offering a metaphorical window into the ‘‘corridors of power’’ through primarysources, and supplementing the large secondary literature and press accounts.3 Indrawing together the evidence, my goal here is to establish whether the expec-tations concerning Blair’s decision-making behavior derived from his personalityprofile receive support in the Iraq case. Table 3 summarizes Blair’s expected be-haviors and impact on policy given his personality, and the evidence from the Iraqdecisions.With Blair’s high score on belief in ability to control events, we would expect himto show evidence of a proactive policy orientation rooted in a perceived internal3 The controversy has been a boon to researchers, who would ordinarily have had to wait 30 years for the releaseof some of the information on the government’s decision making now available. Five main primary sources ofinformation, supplementing numerous secondary accounts, have become available. Firstly, the two cabinet ministerswho resigned over the decision to fight without a second UN resolution, Leader of the House of Commons RobinCook and International Development Secretary Clare Short, published detailed book-length accounts of the de-cision-making process. Short’s account reproduced verbatim large chunks of her contemporaneous diary. Secondly,the death under curious circ*mstances of Dr. David Kelly was investigated by the independent ‘‘Hutton Inquiry.’’Dr. Kelly, a WMD expert who advised the British government on Iraq’s WMD activity, emerged as the source for aBBC report alleging that a dossier released by the government intended to bolster the public perception of a threatfrom Iraq had in fact, in the memorable phrase of the BBC correspondent, been ‘‘sexed up’’ beyond what theintelligence could support. Dr. Kelly was subsequently identified publicly by the government as the source for thereport, and some days later committed suicide. The Hutton inquiry thus indirectly investigated questions pertainingto the use of intelligence in the decisions. Thirdly, the ‘‘Butler inquiry’’ pursued a wider remit concerned with theuse of intelligence, and also processes of decision-making such as the involvement of cabinet more generally.Fourthly, the standing House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs investigated the entirety of ‘‘the decisionto go to war with Iraq,’’ extending its inquiry beyond the originally allotted time period. Hutton, Butler, and theForeign Affairs Committee received direct testimony from senior ministers, and Prime Minister Blair himself.Finally, the controversy over the legal basis of the war has led to the release of the secret personal advice to Blairfrom the British attorney general, in documents that also touch upon the differences in interpretation of the U.S.and the U.K. in March 2003. In addition minutes of a July 2002 discussion of Iraq by Blair’s closest advisers(the‘‘Downing Street Memo’’) were leaked on the eve of the May 2005 General Election. The cumulative effect is that adetailed narrative of the decisions and the role of the major participants can now be established. While of coursefresh details will emerge with the full release of the government’s records, there does exist an unusual opportunityto study a recent episode using high quality sources.Personality and Foreign Policy296TABLE3.ExpectationsandEvidenceoftheImpactofBlair’sPersonalityonBritain’sIraqDecisionsTraitHypothesizedBehaviorEvidencefromIraqDecisionMakingBeliefinabilitytocontrolevents(high)HighperceiveddegreeofpersonalcontroloverenvironmentDiscountingofbarrierstosuccessfulactionPreferenceforproactivepoliciesActivist,interventionistforeignpolicystanceBlair’sbeliefinlikelihoodofpositiveoutcome,intermsofsecuringdomesticsupportandU.N.backingBlair’sbeliefinabilitytoinfluenceforeignpolicyofUnitedStatesandEuropeanopponentsofwarFFrance,Germany,RussiaConceptualcomplexity(low)Blackandwhiteviewofpoliticalactorsandenvironment,binaryclassificationschemePropensitytodiscount/ignoreinformationdiscrepantwithexistingperceptionsDecisivestyle,withlowneedforinformationandminimaldebateBlackandwhiteviewofIraq,expressedinpublicandnotedbycabinetcolleaguesandadvisersGreaterweightgiventointelligencesupportiveofexistingpolicydisposition,withdiscountingofinformationindicatingdoubtsoverIraqWMDcapabilityFramingofIraqquestionasmoralissueof‘rightandwrong’AbsolutistframingofalliancewithUnitedStates,unwillingtoconsidernuancedpositionsshortofcompletesupportNeedforpower(high)GreaterpersonalcontrolandinvolvementinpolicyTendencytoimposepersonalviewsratherthanseekconsensusConcentrationofdecisionmakingwithinsmall,informalgroupshandpickedbyleaderHighpersonalinvolvementinIraqdecisionsRestrictionofopportunitiesforopendebateonIraqpolicyRestrictionofinformationonadvancedstateofpolicymakingbymid-2002andonlegalaspectsofwarUseofinformalsmallgroupsandbilateraldiscussionswithministersmeetinginprimeminister’s‘‘den’’Limiteduseofcabinetandformalizeddecision-makingstructures,includingforeignoffice.Cabinetpresentedwith‘pre-packed’decisionreachedelsewhereExclusionofdissentersfromcorepolicymakinggroupSTEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON 297locus of control, and a high sense of efficacy in terms of shaping the course ofevents. Blair’s foreign policy, both during the Iraq case and in general, has indeedbeen based on activist, interventionist principles (Dunne 2005). As has been re-peatedly noted, Blair is the ‘‘waringest’’ prime minister in British history, havingused force on five occasions in eight years. The clearest elaboration of Blair’s pro-active, interventionist philosophy came in his widely reported ‘‘Doctrine of theInternational Community’’ speech in Chicago during April 1999. Blair suggestedthat the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states should not beregarded as an insurmountable constraint, and ‘‘must be qualified in importantrespects.’’ For Blair, ‘‘the most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identifythe circ*mstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s con-flicts’’ (Blair 1999). Blair argued that dictatorial regimes forfeit their sovereign rightto noninterference both on moral grounds of harming their people and practicalgrounds of threatening others: ‘‘it is states that are repressed, that are dictatorial,that give their people no freedom, that don’t allow them to exercise democraticrights that in my experience and judgment end up threatening others’’ (Blair1999).This interventionist view, which relies on a belief in the efficacy of action by one’sstate as well as the moral imperative to do so, was applied in particular to the Iraqcase (Meyer 2005b). The ‘‘Butler Commission,’’ set up as an independent officialinquiry into the veracity of the government’s claims on Iraqi WMD, reports thatBlair in testimony:. . . told us that even before the attacks of 11 September 2001, his concern in thisarea was increasingly causing him to examine more proactive policy options . . .The prime minister’s view was that a stand had to be taken, and a more activepolicy put in place to prevent the continuing development and proliferation ofnuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and technology, in breach of the will ofthe international community. (Butler 2004:105, paragraph 426)In terms of the impact of Blair’s strong internal locus of control on the decision-making process in the Iraq case, participants have suggested that Blair believed hecould accomplish several difficult tasks in shaping the course of events: convinceU.S. President George W. Bush to seek UN authorization for an attack, convincepublic opinion in Britain of the wisdom of such a course of action, and convinceparliament, and those with substantial doubts in the cabinet, that an attack wasnecessary. President Bush did seek an initial UN resolution, which the Leader ofthe House of Commons and former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook states was ‘‘theonly point in the whole saga where it is possible to pinpoint a clear instance whereBritish influence made any difference to U.S. policy on Iraq’’ (Cook 2004:205).In the other instances, Blair appears to have overestimated the degree to whichhe could influence events. Cook reports being struck on several occasions by Blair’supbeat assessment of the prospects of securing full UN authorization (Cook2004:308, 309, 314), and when this did not transpire, of Blair being ‘‘mystified’’and ‘‘baffled’’ as to how he had got into such a situation (Cook 2004:320, 324).During January 2003, when it was far from certain that the necessary UN reso-lutions could be obtained, Blair confided in a cabinet colleague his confidence inthe outcome: ‘‘We’ll get UN cover under all conceivable circ*mstances. Trust me, Iknow my way through this’’ (Kampfner 2004a:256). However, ministers were saidto be ‘‘united in their slightly nervous wonderment at his certainty’’ of a positiveoutcome (Stephens 2004:219), while a senior cabinet minister recalls that ‘‘he hasgot himself into a situation with no exit strategy. He became subject to forces hecould not control’’ (Kampfner 2004a:255).Those who have interacted with Blair find this to be a characteristic of his politicalstyle. A closeaide comments thatPersonality and Foreign Policy298Tony is the great persuader. He thinks he can convert people even when it mightseem as if he doesn’t have a cat in hell’s chance of succeeding. Call him naı̈ve, callit what you will, but he never gives up. He would say things like ‘‘I can get Jacques(Chirac) to do this’’ or ‘‘leave Putin to me’’(Kampfner 2004a:127).A French official suggests that ‘‘(t)here is not a single problem that Blair thinks hecannot solve with his own personal engagementFit could be Russia, it could beAfrica.’’ However, this can also lead to overreach: ‘‘The trouble is, the world is alittle more complicated than that’’ (Kampfner 2004a:128).Given Blair’s low score on conceptual complexity, we would expect him to framesituations in a black and white manner, exhibit a largely undifferentiated view of hispolitical environment, engage in limited information search before making deci-sions, and show a general reluctance to reconsider policy decisions. There is ev-idence that Blair did indeed operate in this manner during the Iraq decisions.Firstly, Blair defined the Saddam Hussein regime in black and white terms: it was‘‘evil’’ (Webster 2002), these ‘‘are not people like us . . . They are not people whoobey the normal norms of human behavior’’ (Parker 2002). The justification foraction was ‘‘very simple’’: WMD. The need for military action was also categorical:‘‘Iraq must be denied the means to make them’’ (Webster and Hall 2002).Cabinet colleagues felt that Blair did not take sufficient notice of the nuancesassociated with this policy, nor the range of views on the matter among members ofboth the British government and the UN Security Council. Clare Short, the In-ternational Development Secretary at the time, felt he showed a distinct ‘‘lack ofattention to detail’’ (Short 2004:175), a position subsequently echoed by Sir Christ-opher Meyer, U.K. Ambassador to the United States until the eve of the war, whonoted that while Blair ‘‘liked the vision thing . . . he was wasn’t interested in theballast behind the ideas’’ (Glover and MacAskill 2005). An expert on Iraq within theBritish government, who advised Blair before the war, comments somewhat pe-joratively that ‘‘I was staggered at Blair’s . . . inability to engage with the complex-ities. For him, it seemed to be highly personal: an evil Saddam versus Blair–Bush.He didn’t seem to have a perception of Iraq as a complex country’’ (Naughtie2004:62). Indeed, accounts of Blair’s policymaking style invariably stress his focusupon fundamental principles over detail, his limited information search, and hislack of receptivity to information which does not accord with his existing beliefs(Naughtie 2004:14, 17; Seldon 2004:599, 616, 624).This provides some explanation for Blair’s handling of intelligence on IraqiWMD, which the Butler Report (2004:67, paragraph 270) described as ‘‘sporadicand patchy,’’ but Blair apparently viewed as unequivocal. In his foreword to thegovernment’s ‘‘September’’ dossier on Iraqi WMD, Blair stripped the intelligenceof caveats, writing ‘‘(w)hat I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyonddoubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons,that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has beenable to extend the range of his ballistic missile program . . . I am in no doubt thatthe threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that hehas to be stopped’’ (Blair 2003:3). The Hutton inquiry investigated the process ofputting together this dossier, finding that the prime minister had called for its‘‘strengthening’’ on several occasions. Presented with the assertively worded finaldraft, Blair’s close adviser Alastair Campbell reported to the authors that the primeminister found it ‘‘good: but I pointed out to him that he is not exactly a ‘don’tknow’ on the issue.’’ (Hutton 2004:133, paragraph 212). The Butler inquiry(2004:82, paragraph 331) suggested that the interpretation of the intelligence inthis dossier went to the ‘‘outer limits’’ of what was reasonable. Blair’s use of theintelligence in a manner which did not recognize the caveats and uncertaintiesinvolved is consistent with the information processing style of lower complexityleaders.STEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON 299Blair’s lower complexity score also provides some explanation for his muchcommented upon moralistic style and, unusually for a British prime minister, use ofreligious references (Seldon 2004:515–516). Indeed, it has been suggested (mostlyby British observers) that the shared religiosity of Blair and President Bush canhelp explain their shared view of the Iraq situation (Shawcross 2003:46–47; Fergu-son 2004:12–14). Paul Hoggett (2005:418) suggests that the prime minister suc-cumbed to ‘‘a number of powerful illusions touching upon notions of imminence,teleology and salvation through which Blair’s religiosity found expression in thesecular field of global politics.’’ However, ‘‘religiosity’’ in itself is an insufficientexplanation for foreign policy actions: there were, to lodge only the most obviousobjection to this as an explanatory variable, many people of faith who did notsupport the war. That being said, the particular interpretation of morality by Blair,especially his comfort with black and white judgments of right and wrong, would beexpected given his lower scores on conceptual complexity. Blair’s explanation of hisfaith is consistent with this interpretation. As he wrote in the foreword to a col-lection of essays on faith and politics:Christianity is a very tough religion, it is judgmental. There is right and wrong.There is good and bad. We all know this, of course, but it has become fashionableto be uncomfortable about such language. But when we look at our world todayand how much needs to be done, we should not hesitate to make such judgments.(quoted in Kampfner 2004a:74)The salient point is not that Blair’s faith directs his foreign policy, but that hisinterpretation of issues of morality and faith is essentially dichotomous, and that heshows evidence of viewing foreign policy as having a significant moral dimension.As William Shawcross (2003:47), who is supportive of Blair’s choices, puts it ‘‘(t)hereis of course far more to Blair’s decision making than his religion. But he brought hisviews of right and wrong to the conduct of Britain’s foreign policy.’’Blair’s absolutist framing of the alliance with the United States is also consistentwith a lower complexity information processing style. Robin Cook states that it is a‘‘fixed pole’’ of Blair’s world view, not just that the alliance is important (whichwould not be a particularly distinctive viewpoint), but that the United Kingdom‘‘must be the No. 1 ally of the United States’’ (Cook 2004:102; Naughtie 2004:129).For Blair, there could be no position in relation to the United States which stoppedshort of complete support with commitment of military forces: Not for Blair Ed-ward Heath’s studied neutrality, nor Harold Wilson’s refusal to commit Britishtroops during Vietnam. In Blair’s view, any deviation from absolute support riskedthe entire alliance, as he indicated in responding to cabinet suggestions that hecould perhaps afford to be more critical of the United States: ‘‘I will tell you that wemust stand close to America. If we don’t, we will lose our influence to shape whatthey do’’ (Seldon 2004:574). Foreign Secretary Jack Straw suggested to Blair thaton this occasion, given the domestic political difficulties and the lack of internationalsupport for war, the United Kingdom should qualify its commitment to the UnitedStates, offering political support but no troops. Blair rejected this on the groundsthat the U.K. alliance with the United States was an all or nothing proposition(Kampfner 2004a:168, 203).Blair is distinctive in one other trait: his high score on need for power. Given this,we wouldexpect him to maintain control over policy decisions and processes, andto take decisions in small groups of hand-picked advisers or bilaterally with seniorministers. In many ways, Blair’s high need for power should act to magnify theimpact of his other personality traits on British foreign policy, given that individualswith a high need for power tend to take tight personal control over policy proc-esses. In an overall sense, Blair has indeed consistently demonstrated a high degreeof personal involvement in foreign policy making. Philip Gould, a close adviser toPersonality and Foreign Policy300Blair, notes that his preferred mode of operation is a ‘‘unitary command structure’’(Rentoul 2001:544), while another aide commented that Blair in his degree ofpersonal involvement sought to exercise ‘‘Napoleonic’’ control (Hennessy2001:478). In the period leading up to the Iraq war, Blair’s foreign secretary,Jack Straw, found it difficult to exercise much authority in foreign policy givenBlair’s close involvement (Maddox 2002). He confirmed this, albeit diplomatically,by noting that ‘‘There is a recognition that if there is an international crisis on thisscale the head of the government will be leading the national effort, and he hadsure better be’’ (Beeston and Webster 2001:1).During the Iraq decisions, Blair largely made policy through what has beencalled his ‘‘inner–inner’’ circle of personal advisers (Guha 2003; Cook 2004:112). Asenior minister observed that Blair was wary of open debate: ‘‘Tony says he doesdiscuss this with colleagues, but he does not like things to get out of control,’’preferring instead bilateral meetings with senior colleagues or making policy insmall, informal groups, often on the No. 10 sofa (White 2002). Clare Short, upset atbeing excluded from the core policy-making group, reported to the House ofCommons Foreign Affairs Committee that policy was made by Blair and his hand-picked, nonministerial advisers: ‘‘That close entourage . . . That was the team, theywere the ones who moved together all the time. They attended the daily ‘warcabinet.’ That was the in group, that was the group that was in charge of policy’’(House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2003:43, paragraph 141).In theory, Iraq decisions should have been taken through a combination of theCabinet Committee on Overseas Policy and Defense (OPD), a smaller group suitedto handling details, and the full cabinet, which should have set the basic parametersof policy. However, Blair disliked the OPD, finding it ‘‘too formal’’ and ‘‘insuffi-ciently focused’’ (Seldon 2004:580). Consequently, OPD never met, with Blair in-stead operating through his informal inner circle. Minutes of a crucial inner circlemeeting from July 2002, at which personal advisers to Blair far outnumberedcabinet ministers, show that the inner circle was far ahead of the cabinet in terms ofwar planning. The minutes recount that, given U.S. attitudes, ‘‘military action wasnow seen as inevitable,’’ and ‘‘we should work on the assumption that the U.K.would take part in any military action’’ (Rycroft 2002). However, as late as August2002 Blair was resisting requests from cabinet ministers for a full discussion of Iraq,on the basis that ‘‘Anglo-U.S. decisions are still a long way off ’’ (White 2002:1).Anthony Seldon (2004:261) argues that this is characteristic of Blair’s overallpolicy style: that he runs a ‘‘denocracy,’’ with policy made by close advisers secludedin a private study known as ‘‘the den.’’ Peter Stothard (2003), who spent 30 daysshadowing Blair in the run up to the war, found him constantly surrounded by ahand-picked ‘‘team,’’ with whom many of the most significant decisions were made.He also found that members of the ‘‘team’’ were similar to Blair in policy outlookand work habits. Further, there is some evidence that Blair is distrustful of theForeign Office as an institution, and has preferred to conduct foreign policythrough a personalized network of advisers reporting directly to 10 Downing Street(Riddell 2003:16; Kampfner 2004a:266). In this light, it is significant that SirChristopher Meyer, British ambassador to the United States during the Iraq crisis,would later reveal that he ‘‘rarely bothered with the Foreign Office’’ during his timein Washington, instead talking directly to Blair or to his senior foreign policy aideSir David Manning (Kampfner 2004a:195). Meyer (2005a) claims that ‘‘between 9/11 and the day I retired at the end of February 2003 on the eve of war, I had not asingle substantive policy discussion on the secure phone with the F(oreign)O(ffice).’’The consequences of this style of operation were that when cabinet met to discussIraq policy, the formal processes of preparing briefing and options papers andcirculating them beforehand were rarely followed. Additionally, most key decisionshad been effectively taken by Blair and the inner circle in earlier meetings.STEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON 301Consequently, cabinet was presented with a verbal presentation of the situation bythe prime minister or foreign secretary, in the context of their being a clear ‘‘pre-packed’’ decision for their approval, rather than an opening to a discussion. As theButler report states:Without papers circulated in advance, it remains possible but is obviously muchmore difficult for members of the cabinet outside the small circle directly involvedto bring their political judgment and experience to bear on the major decisionsfor which the cabinet as a whole must carry responsibility . . . We are concernedthat the informality and circ*mscribed character of the government’s proce-dures which we saw in the context of policymaking towards Iraq risks reduc-ing the scope for informed political judgment. (Butler 2004:147–148, paragraph610–611)In this regard, the handling of the legal aspects of the war is also significant. Blairhad been asked by Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, head of U.K. armed forces, to securea definitive opinion on the legality of the use of force absent explicit UN author-ization. This Blair sought from Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, who sub-mitted a personal memo to the prime minister on March 7, 2003. In it, Goldsmithargued that while a ‘‘reasonable case’’ could be made that action would be legal,there were no guarantees that opponents of the action would not bring a case, andin those circ*mstances ‘‘(w)e cannot guarantee that they would not succeed’’(Goldsmith 2003). Goldsmith’s opinion is filled with caveats and comprises 13 singlespaced pages of close legal reasoning. However, when the cabinet came to considerthe legal aspects on the March 17, this document was not made available to them.Instead, they were presented with the attorney general’s one-page summary of hisadvice in the form of an answer to a parliamentary question. This had beenstripped of the caveats in the original opinion.Clare Short suggested that it was solely on the basis of the attorney general’sassurances in this regard that she had not resigned on the spot over the decision.Her diary records that ‘‘I tried to start discussion and asked why it (the legalopinion) was so late, had he had doubts? . . . His advice was that it was legal under(UN Resolution) 1441 and that was it’’ (Short 2004:186). Short further recalled that‘‘When Goldsmith presented his findings to the cabinet that day, he began to readout his statement, only to be interrupted by Blair, who insisted that ministers couldread it for themselves later. When attempts were made to question Goldsmith, Blairdeclared that there was no time for a discussion and that the legal opinion was‘clear’’’ (Kampfner 2004b:21–23). Blair later justified these procedures by arguingthat the attorney general had been present at cabinet, and had presented his fullopinion orally (BBC Question Time 2005). However, in light of the Butler con-clusions, this seems a further instance of an informal and highly centralized styleofdecision making which reduced the involvement of regularized structures such asthe cabinet.In summary, Blair’s personality appears to have played a substantial role inshaping the process and outcome of British decision making in the Iraq case. With astrong internal locus of control, Blair fashioned a proactive foreign policy orien-tation based on interventionist principles. There is evidence that he perceived en-vironmental constraints upon applying these principles to Iraq to besurmountableFbelieving that UN resolutions could be obtained and that the Brit-ish domestic scene would come to support the policy. Blair’s lower conceptualcomplexity found expression in his black and white framing of the Saddam Husseinregime, the necessity for military measures to remove Iraqi WMD, and the abso-lutist framing of the alliance with the United States. Finally, his higher need forpower disposed him to concentrate decision making within small groups of like-minded, hand-picked advisers, somewhat insulating the decision-making processPersonality and Foreign Policy302from the full range of viewpoints and debate within the cabinet and the ForeignOffice.ConclusionI have sought to establish in this paper that an explanation focused on the per-sonality of Prime Minister Tony Blair accounts rather well for the major aspects ofthe British choice in Iraq. Using at-a-distance measures, Blair’s personality wasrecovered from his responses to foreign policy questions in the British House ofCommons. These data showed that Blair has a high belief in his ability to controlevents, a low conceptual complexity, and a high need for power. In the Iraq de-cisions, the evidence indicates broad support for the expectations as to Blair’spreferences and behavior derived from his personality profile. He demonstrated aproactive policy orientation, internal locus of control in terms of shaping events, abinary information processing and framing style, and a preference to work throughtightly held processes in policy making.This advances our understanding in several ways. Firstly, the extent of Blair’sinfluence over the process and outcome of the British choice in Iraq reemphasizesthe importance of actor-specific factors in theories of foreign policy. Put simply, theproposition that ‘‘who leads matters’’ does seem to be supported in this instance.More specifically, the patterns of policymaking followed by Blair accord with thosebehaviors found in individuals with similar personalities in the work of Preston(2001), Kowert (2002), Hermann (2003), and others. Secondly, the correspondencebetween expected and observed behavior given Blair’s personality is further ev-idence for the validity of Hermann’s technique as one which robustly distinguishesbetween individuals, and provides meaningful data useful in explaining foreignpolicy behaviors. Finally, the extension of theoretical and empirical research onleader personality and style beyond the U.S. presidency, where it has been pre-dominantly focused, has long been recognized as desirable by scholars working inthe field of foreign policy analysis (Kaarbo 1997:554; Walker 2000:600; Kille andScully 2003:189).At the outset of the analysis I suggested that the British–American alliance doesnot appear on its own to be a sufficient explanation of Britain’s Iraq policy choices.Blair was a proponent of action against Iraq before the Bush administrationadopted the policy, and the U.S. was quite sanguine about the prospect of Britishnonparticipation in the war. Moreover, the history of the ‘‘special relationship’’includes instances of defection from the alliance as well as cooperation. This is notthe place for a full account, but Louise Richardson (1996) shows that Britain andAmerica sharply disagreed and acted in ways inconsistent with the other’s interestsin the Suez and Falklands crisis, while Jonathan Colman (2004) and Sylvia Ellis(2004) have recently published detailed accounts of Harold Wilson’s refusal tocontribute British forces to the Vietnam conflict in spite of repeated requests,shading into demands, by President Johnson. The indeterminate way in which thealliance affects British foreign policy in the historical record allows for the influenceof other factors, such as the individual characteristics of the prime minister, onBritish policy choices.Of course, further alternative explanations for Britain’s Iraq policy could beforwarded. Again, a full accounting of these is beyond the scope of this article, andperhaps should await the full release of the government’s records. However, theinitial evidence suggests an individual level explanation fares rather well. Publicopinion in Britain ran strongly against the war, indicating that there would be apolitical cost involved in the undertaking and counting against a domestic politicsexplanation. As the evidence above indicates, much of elite opinion among theruling Labour Party and the cabinet of Prime Minister Blair was also against thewar. Finally, as Akan Malici (2005) has convincingly shown, other mid-sizedSTEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON 303European powers with security relationships with the United States, in particularFrance and Germany, declared their opposition to the use of force.Clearly, there are caveats to be recognized. One is the incomplete nature of thedecision making record. While a good deal of information is available, there is thedanger that fresh evidence will cause a reconsideration of aspects of the argumentforwarded here. A further caveat is inherent to studies of a single policy makingepisode. There are limits to the generalizability of the findings, and I would notwant to suggest that all studies of British foreign policy, and the foreign policy ofother states, should begin and end with the individual characteristics of the leader.Even with objective at-a-distance measures of personality, which find substantiveconfirmation in particular episodes, explanations of political outcomes rooted inindividual personality must always be phrased in conditional terms and take ac-count of situational variables (Winter 2003:133–134).Further studies of comparable episodes would be welcome. In particular, a fullreconsideration, informed by foreign policy analysis theories, of Prime MinisterHarold Wilson’s decisions in regard to Vietnam would be particularly appropriate,given the similarities between the two episodes in all but outcome. Further, a fas-cinating comparative study would develop a personality profile of George W. Bushand examine the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq in that light. Future researchaside, the evidence from the British choice in Iraq does suggest that under certaincirc*mstances individual level explanations of foreign policy can perform well, andthat Tony Blair’s personality is a crucial factor in understanding why the Britishwent to war.ReferencesASHDOWN, PADDY. (2001) The Ashdown Diaries. London: Allen Lane.BBC NEWS. (2005) Question Time: Leaders’ Special. April 25, 2005.BEESTON, RICHARD, AND PHILLIP WEBSTER. (2001) Straw Denies Rift Over Blair Role. The Times, Lon-don, November 6, 2001.BLAIR, TONY. 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